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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
EDITH tvf. LANGLOIS~ 
Plaintiff and Appel! ant, 
vs. 
NORMAN T. REES~ 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9054 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff and appellant will be referred to as plaintiff 
or in her own na.rne ~ and the defendant and respondent wilt 
be referred to as defendant or in his own name. 
All italics are ours. 
The plaintiff, Edith M. Langlois~ brought this action 
against Norman T. Rees for injuries she sustained when struck 
by an automobile driven by the defendant. The accident oc-
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cur red on the 25th day of March~ 195-8, at about 4:30 p.m~ 
Mr~~·-·La.ngl~1s was walking east across an urUnarked crosswalk 
from the Vlt'est side of State Street to the east, on the south side 
of the inter section of First A venue. 
In her complaint) the plaintiff complained the defendant 
was negligent in (a) failure to yield the right-of-wayt (b) 
traveling too f a5 t for existing conditions, (c) f a:i 1 ure to have 
his automobile under control, and (d) fail u.re to keep a proper 
lookout. 
The de£ en dant answer edt denying negligence and claimed 
that the injuries 'v ere contributed to by the negligence of the 
plaintiff. 
The lssu~s c~eated by the pleadings and the pretrial order 
as amended were as follo,vs: The plaintiff claimed defendant 
'vas negligent in (a.) failu~e to ~iel~ right-of-wayt (b) travel-
ing too fast for existing conditions~ (c) failur~ to keep his 
car under contio 1 so as to a void striking plaintiff, (d) £ail ure 
to keep a proper lookout) (e) fai I ure to keep his windshiel~ 
properly clear so he could see wh~1.t was on the highway to be 
seen~ and (f) plain tiii 1 s entitled to recover on the last clear 
chance doctrine+ Dcfendanfs cont~tions were that plaintiff 
(a) failed to yield the right-of-way to defendant and (b) 
failed to kcc p a pro per lookout, and cited Section 41-6-79) 
subsections (a) and (c), U.C.A~ 1953, and defendant denied 
he was negligent. 
The case came on for trial before a jury on the 3rd and 
4th days of March, 1959. Exhibit 1~ a map of the intersection 
drawn by an engineer, was admitted in evidence, and Exhibits 
2 ~ · 3 ~ 4, and 5 ~ all pictures of the intersection, \v e rc admitted. 
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The court refused to give the following instructions te· 
quested by plain tiff: 
N (). 1, plain tiff~ s request that the court hold defendant ne gli-
gent as a matter of law, and direct a verdict fo.r the plaintiff. 
No.2 
The mere fact that the plaintiff was not in the 
marked crosswalk at the time she was struck by de-
fendanfs automobile will not relieve the defendant 
from lia hili ty unless she was guilty of other con tr i bu-
tory negligence that proximately resulted in her in-
JUrtes+ 
And the following h.vo instructions from JI FU: 
It is the duty of the driver of an automobile to yield 
the right~of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway 
'vi thin any tnar ked crosswalk, or \Vi thin aq. y crosS· 
walk even if it is not marked at the end of any block+ 
Failure to so yield the right·of.way to a pedestrian 
in any such crosswalk would constitute negligence. 
JIFU 20.6~ 
As to locality on a. roadway such as that involved 
in this case) these £actors enter in to consideration o £ 
the question of what conduct is required of a pedestrian 
in the exercise of ordinary care in crossing a high Vtra y. 
1. If he crosses within a marked cross"valk, or at an 
intersection v.,r i thin a crosswalk) whether mar ked or 
not, tbc lav.r requires the driver of all vehicles to yield 
the right-of -way to him. 
2. If he crosses at any other place~ the lavl requires 
him to yield the right-of.way to all vehicles on the 
roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
although this req uiretnent does not relieve r h c driver 
of a vehicle from the duty to ex ere is e ordinary care 
for the safety of any pedestrian upon a roadway~ 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. The amount of caution recjuired to constitute 
ordinarv care increases as does the danger that a. r.e.a-
sonab ly .. prudent person, in like position, would a.ppre-
hend in the situation~ For example~ heavy veht~lar 
traffic fast traffic poor visibility ob struc:tions to vtew., 
v.ret p~vement-a~y of these or 'any other perceivable 
factor increasing the hazard, increases the amount of 
caution \Vhich an ordinary prudent person would use. 
JIFU 20.8. 
No.5 
It is not enough that a driver be able to stop within 
the range of his vis ion or that he use diligence to stop 
after discerning an object. The rule makes no allowance 
for delay in action. He must, on pe[il of legal· negli-
gence, so drive that he can actually discover an object., 
perform· the necessary acts necessary to stopping, and 
bring the car to a comp tete halt within such range if 
necessary to avoid collision with and injury to others 
on the highway. If his vision is obscured by sno·w, 
sleet or fog on the windshield or windows so that he 
cannot see the required distance ahead, or to the side 
.as the case rna y bet he mustt \vithin such distance from 
the point of such lack of vision~ bring his car to such 
control that he can stop immediately, and if he cannot 
then see~ should stop.-72 A.L.R. 1352. 
~rhe following are instructions of the court pertinent to 
plain tiff's claims in this case: 
NoL 4 
It was the duty of defendant Norman T~ Rees to 
use reasonable care under the circumstances of this 
cJ.se in drjving his automobile to avoid danger to him~ 
self and others and to observe and be a ware of the 
condition of the highway, traffic thereon and other 
existing. conditions an~ particularly with respect to 
the parttculars of neghgence charged by the plaintiff~ 
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he was obliged to observe due care in a 11 respects as 
to the fol Jowing: 
(a) Not to travel too fast for existing conditions. 
(b) To keep his car under reasonable~ safe and 
proper control+ 
(c) T') keep a lookout for conditions rea.son.a bl y to 
be anticipated ahead of him. 
(q) To keep his windshield reasonably clear so that 
he (auld 5ee what ~vas on the highway to be seen. 
With. respect to the allegation that defendant failed 
to yield the right-of-way~ the court instructs you that 
that allegation is not a p plica bl e bee a use of an ins true-
tion in that regard \vhich will be giv~n to you. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that defendant \\'aS negligent in one or more of the 
foregoing fou.r particulars ( right.of-way being exclud· 
ed) and that such negligence vtas the proximate cause of 
the accident and of plaintiffs injuries then un1ess you 
find also that plaintiff is barred from recovering from 
defendant because of her contributory negligence~ upon 
which subject you will also be instructed, your ver diet 
shall be for the plaintiH and against the de£ endant. 
No .. 6 
At the time of this accident, one of the la\vs of Utah read 
as follows: 
~ ~ Behveen adjacent 1 n te rsections at which traffic con-
tro l signals arc in operation) pedestrians shall not cross 
at any place except in a marked crosswalk.t! 
Under this law, plaintiff \vas prohibited from cross-
ing State Street at any point other than the marked 
crosswalk on the north side of the inter section of State 
Street and First Avenue., and since it is admitted that 
she did not attempt to u.se the rn arked crosswalk at 
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that point~ the court rules that she violated th~ above 
la "\\,. and that such .a violation constituted neghgence · 
No.7 
U tab 1 a vl requires that a pedestrian crossing the 
street at a point other than vii thin a marke? cross~alk 
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an 1ntersect1on, 
1nust yield the right·of-w.ay to all automobiles a.p~ 
proaching so near as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
The parties have stipulated and agreed that at the 
point where plaintiff was crossing~ there was no marked 
cross"i;:\ralk. This court instructs you that the place where 
pia in tiff \\-·as attempting to cross State Street was not 
~ 1; an un1n a r ked eros swal k at an intersection,'· as those 
t eons are used in Utah law, and theret"ore plainti.H 
was required to yield the right-of-way to defendant's 
approaching automobile. Therefore, if you find that 
defendanfs automobile was so near as to constitute 
·an immediate hazard and that the plaintiff did not 
yield the right-of-way, she was negligent. 
No.8 
Regardless of the court! s instruction that plain tiff 
was guilty of negligence in crossing \vhere she did 
and regardless of whether you sha.I l determine that 
she was negligent ln failing to yield the right--of-way 
to clef en dant ~ if you do so determine, the court instructs 
you that before either or both of such acts of negli-
gence wi 11 bar plaintiff from recovering her damages 
from defendant you must fir5t .6nd that either one or 
both of such acts of negligence was a. proximate~ con~ 
tributory cause of the accident and of plaintiff) s Jn. 
JUnes. 
If you Ji nd this issue against defend ant and for the 
plaintiff .and if you also shall have found against the 
defendant a.nd for the plaintiff with respect to the 
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allegations of defendanfs negligence then you may 
assess plain tiff~ s damages un de.r the instructions to 
be given you in that regard. 
If you find the issue of contributory negl.lgence 
against the plain tiff and £or the defendant you v.,T ill 
yet be required to determine and find \vhether plain-
tiff's contributory negligence is excused by reason of 
the rules of what is knov.rn in the lavl as the Last Clear 
Chance Rule~ 
Instruct ion No. 9 was the instruction as to the 1 as t clear 
chance. We are not including K o. 1 ~ 2) 3, and 5, nor the stock 
ins t.tuction.s. 
The case was submitted to the jury and they returned a 
verdict of no cause of action. Thereafter, the plaintiff made a 
motion for new trial \Vhich was by the court denied on April 6, 
1959, and thereafter~ within the time required by lavl~ the 
plaintiff filed her appeal to the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
First A venue intersects ~'ith North State Street but does 
not cross State Street. First Avenue from curb to curb is fifty-
eight feet, six inches wide. The north and south traffic on State 
Street is divided by double lines, and there are t\\/0 lanes for 
the north bound t raHic and two lanes for the southbound traffic. 
There is a marked pedestrian crossing on the north side of the 
intersection crossing State Strc et~ and there is a sign on the 
northeast corner of State ~treet~ facing north and south, marked 
~~pedestrian lane4" The sidewalk on the south side of first 
Avenue is tv.fel ve feet v.,T ide and there is not a tnar ked cros_sing 
at that point to the west side of State Street. 1~here was no 
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sign or barrier. on either side indicating that a person ~hould 
. not cross at that point (see ex:hibi ts) 7 There is a stop slgn on 
First Avenue on the northeast corner of the intersection fot 
traffic going west on First Avenue (see Exhibit l, a map of 
' the ar~a, and Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5, pictures of the area)~ 
There ~re traffic control signals at South Temple and State 
Street and at North T etn pte and State Street. 
The accident occurred while the plaintiff was crossing 
State Street in the unmarked crosswalk on the south side of 
the in tersec ti on of First Avenue and State St [ect. 
The plaintiff in this case is a widow+ She 'A-·as eighty-four 
years of age. at the time of the accident. She lived at the Gate-
way Apartments at 28 North State Street and had lived there 
for eleven years (R. 57). 
The plaintiff knew there was a crosswalk on the north 
side of the street and knew that it had painted lines and knew 
that it was by the stores (R. 68) . She knew that people used 
the south era sswalk. Almost everybody used it, and this had 
been going on for the eleven years she had lived there (R~ 56, 
59, 60, and 69) .. 
On the day of the accident~ March 25, 1958, the plaintiff 
\vent to the L.D.S. Temple early in the morning. The weather 
was nice when she went but it v~·a.s raining and sno\Ving when 
she started home about 4:00 p.m. She walked up through the 
general offices of the Mutual and through the little alley 
onto the west sidewalk of State Street She turned south and 
walked just beyond the post which is a little north of the 
north boundary of the unmarked south crossing. across State 
Street (R. 58-61). 
10 
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She looked up and down to see if there were any cars, and 
there weren't any. There was no car coming down First Avenue 
that had entered the intersection and so she decided to cross+ 
She started to go across and she was knocked down and knocked 
unconscous (R. 59). She \vas walking straight east toward 
the sidewalk (R .61) ~ 
Norman T. Rees~ the defendant, lived at 402 First Avenue 
and was twenty~.fi ve years old and single. He had driven a car 
since he was eighteen years old and had a Utah driver~ s lie ens e 
restricted to wearing glasses when he drove (R. 30). 
On March 25, 1958~ the day of the accident~ he had a 
two-door green Champion 19 50 Studebaker that had been 
driven 70,000 to 80,000 miles. He drove west on First Avenue 
in order to get to 3 5 Richards Street where he worked. He 
testified that visibility \Vas poor and the snow was plastering 
on the windshield) a v,oet~ heavy snow (R. 34). His right front 
window and left front window 'vere fogged. He could only 
see through the s~·eep of the windshield wiper on the wind-
shield ( R. 3 8) . He could see 5 traigh t ahead but he had cliff icul ty 
seeing to the left or right. As he went down First Avenue 
approaching State Street., he was in the lane next to the center. 
He knew about the stop sjgn on State Street and First Avenue 
(R. 35) ~ 
He stopped at the stop sign, according to his testimony, 
and after looking to the north and south and there vlas no 
traffic, made his turn. He said he made a normal left hand 
turn ( R. 3 6) . Defendant Rees didn~ t know exactly what part 
of the street Mrs. Langlois~ the plaintiff, was in~ By that, he 
meant how far south she was. He said she \vas three or four 
11 
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feet from the curb when he first saw her and that she was 
\valking in an easterly direction (R. 36-3 7). He said Mrs. 
Langlois ~T as walking about medium speed. 
On the map he made ~ mark that would be about forty 
feet from v.rhere he claimed \vas the point of impact~ There 
he m.ade the turn~ However, he said he didn't see her until 
he was about ten or tw·elve feet from her. 1\.s he was going 
around the turn onto State Street, he was unable to see Mrsr 
Langlois (R. 47). He first saw her about three or four feet 
east of the west curb and she was hit fowteen feet west of the 
..... 
east curb. He .figured he was going ten or fifteen miles per 
hour as he started to 1nake the turn. The defendant admitted 
that in his deposition he said he struck her about even with 
the south side~·alk of First Avenue. The defendant was very 
familiar with the inter$ection and he had seen people go across 
the unmarked crosswalk. However, he said they were jaywalk~ 
ing (R. 51). 
He testified tha·t Mrs. Langlois had a piece of newspaper 
over her head to protect herself from the snow and that from 
the time he first sa\\· her when she was three or four feet 
from the curb~ he never took his eyes off her and that she 
didn~t turn her head~ change her pace, or stop (R. 52). He 
. was doing everything he could to stop his car ( R~ 48 and 53) ~ 
and when he stopped she was lying down with her head to the 
south and her feet to the north .. 
He picked up the newspaper and put it in his car. How-
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He did not recall looking across the street before he 
made his move from the stop sign and he didn't recall seeing 
the plain tiff before she 1 eft the sidewalk and he di dn j t believe 
cllat he honked his horn (R. SG-57). 
0 .ff ice r Proctor Lescoe "'-as a police officer and he had been 
for two years~ On that date he \Vas assigned to accident inves-
tigation (R. 15). He arrived at the intersection at 1:39 p.m. 
and when he arrived he s a~r the de£ endant T s automobile and 
Mrs. Langlois and the po 1 ice ambulance+ He tcs tified that it 
was snowing a wet snow. He measured where Mrs. Langlois 
was, and she v./as twelve feet south of t!}.e south edge of the 
extended sidewa~k and the car was e]cven feet (R. 15 and 16). 
H c tal ked to the de£ endant in the police ca.r and the 
defendant told him his estimate of his speed as he made his left 
turn was fifteen miles per hour~ and that he first observed the 
pedestrian thirty to forty feet· away, and that the impact speed 
a.t the time of the collision 'vas five to ten miles per hour. His 
general statement to Mr ~ Lescoe was: 
Lii was stopped at the stop sign on First Avenue and 
State. I 1 ooked both ~lays; no cars were coming so I 
made a left turn. Didn't see her until 1 v.ras almost on 
top of her. There 1A1as some frost on my right front 
window.n (R.17) " 
According to the rna P~ l\1r. Lesco e said that Mrs. Langlois 
,vas about fourteen feet east of the west curb of State Street. 
On cross examination by defendant's counsel, 1V1r. Lescoe stated 
that he didn ~ t find anything at the scene of the accident in di-
eating that defendant's estimate of his speed \Vas not proper. 
Mr. Lescoe said that if the defendant sa \V the plain tiff three 
13 
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or four feet away and was going fi £teen mil cs per hour, he 
couldn't have reduced his speed to five or ten ~_iles per hour 
in three or four feet. He said that. at fifteen miles per hour it 
v.:ould take tv.renty-five to thirty feet to stopt and at five miles 
per hour jt would take· seven feet or probably ten feet on wet 
pavement (R. 19~24). 
l.Vlr. Lescoe said that according to his measurements that 
day she v.-~as about twelve feet west of the east curb line~ but 
according to Exhibit 1 (the engineer's dra\ving) it would be 
fourteen feet west (R. 19). 
Mrs. Langlois was taken by the ambulance over to the 
Clinic and Dr. Crockett wouldn! t let her in. He said she would 
have to go to the hospitaL She passed out and didn't remember 
anything until she was in bed in the L~D. S. Hos pita I~ where 
she stayed for about three days. They took x.ra.ys and put on 
a cast. 
She used crutches for a few days and then a cane. She was 
bruised all ove:r -(R. 60r62). She was sore aod her ankle pruned 
some and she had to stay in bed a good deal of the time for a 
few days. Her daughter stayed with her for several weeks. She 
kept the cast on durjng that time and us.ed a cane for about 
three months. 
She went to England in August~ 1958~ and in England 
she seemed to get_ along pretty well (R~ 63-64). 
She didn't recaU having a newspaper over her head. 
Dr~ Thomas E. Bauman~ an orthopedic surgeon with the 
Salt Lake Clinic~ testified that he sa\v Mrs. Langlois at the 
L.D.S. Hospital on March 25~ 1958~ and he examined her. 
14 
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She had a fracture of the lateral malleolus and she was treated 
with a plaster cast and bed rest for dizziness. She had a short 
leg cast put on and wore it until May, 1958, when it was taken 
off and her recovery v..·as very satisfactory ( R. 30~ 3 3) . 
THE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The plaintiff makes the following assignments of error: 
1. The verdict of the jury \vas contrary to the great v.:eight 
of the evidence and was unsupported by the evidence. 
2. The Court erred in not directing the jury to return a 
verdict in favor of the plai_ntiff and against the defendant. 
3. The Court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for: nev..r 
trial'. 
4. The Court erred in refusing to give the jury plaintiffs 
requested Instruction No. 2 and JIFlJ 20.6 and 20.8. 
5. The Court erred in its failure a.n d refusal to give p 1 a in-
tiffs requested Instruction No. 5 .. 
6. The Court erred in its failure to include in Instruction 
No .. 4 ·that the defendant failed to yield the right~of.way to 
plaintiff. 
7 r The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 6~ 
8. The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 7. 
The plaintiff relies upon each of the assignments of error 
set forth above and will consider the a ssi gnmen ts in the follow-
ing ar gum en t consisting of two dlfferent points. Assignment 
of error No. 3, of course, is included in each of the two argu· 
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men ts as there vias su:ff icien t error to justify the granting of a 
new trial under ea,h point 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY, 
IN INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6 AND 7l THAT THE PLAIN-
'TIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A !VIA TTER OF LAW~ AND 
ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFjS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2, AND INCLUDING JlFU 20.6 AND 
20.8~ 
Assignments of Error 4l 6, 7, and 8. 
The Court based these instructions upon Section 41-6A 79l 
Utah Code Annotated 19 53: · 
~~Pedestrians shall yield right-of-way.-
(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other tb an within a marked crosswalk or within 
an unmarked crosswa]k at an intersection shall yield 
the right -of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
(c) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic 
control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not 
cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk." 
The question imm edi a tel v arises: Does the. intersection 
of First A venue and State Stree; ~ef:Jliz £i6tr~[ fntersection ? To 
decide this question~ we will :first look to our own statute 
which defines ~'intersection~~ and ~~cross\valk. ~~ 
~ ~ 41· 6· B. In tersection-.-----crossw a lk .-
(a) ~~Intersection., j ( 1 ) The a rea embraced within 
the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, 
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or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the road-
ways of two highways which join one another at, or 
approximately at) right angles~ or the area within which 
vehicles. traveling upon different highways joining at 
any other angle in conflict. 
(b) ·~crosswalk.'' That part of a roadway at an in~ 
te rsection included within the connections of the I a teral 
lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway 
measured £rom the curbs~ or in the absence of curbs) 
from the edges of the traversab I e roadway; any portion 
of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly 
indicated for pedestrian crossing by 1 ines or other mark-
ings on the surface~ 1 ~ 
Under that definition there can be no doubt that it is an 
inter section+ The fact that First A venue stops at State Street 
and does not cross beyond State Street would not change the 
'Situation. 5 American Juris prudence, Sec. 288 ~ p. 662: 
!tThe 'veight of authority is to the effect that an 
~intersection t within the meaning of traffic statutes or 
regulations .arises from the meeting of one street with 
another at an angle, a 1 though one of the streets stops 
at and does not cross the other. Other cases require 
the streets to eros s in order that they shall be con-
sidered intersecting streets ... 31 A.L.R. 488 ( anno-
tation) . Junction of two streets rna y form a high way 
intersection with a. traffic statute or regulation, although 
one of them extends only to and not beyond the other 
is supported by the 1\~"eight of authorityrn 78 A.L~R. 
1198-supplemental to 31 A.L.R. 488~ holds the same. 
It is ~dmitted that at the time of the accident there ~ras 
a traffic control signal working at North Temple and State 
Street and also at South Temple and State Street. If North 
Temple and State Street and South T em pie and State Street, 
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where there are traffic control lights~ are adjacent intersections~ 
then perhaps the lower Court would haiie been right. 
The v.rord "ad jacenf j is relative ~ n meaning~ and its con· 
s t ruction is de terrnined by the con text in v.,· h ich it is used in 
a statute. Grudnosky v. Bislo\\:, 88 K.\Xl. 2nd 847 (Minn. 
1943). 
State ex reL Dryman v. "District Court of Ninth Judicial 
District, Supreme Court of Montana~ 1954;> 276 P(2d) 969. 
This Court cited vlith approval the definition of ''adjacent'' 
from 1 C.J~S·;> pp. 1464-1465: 
"Th c ~To rd ·ad jacenf is of Latin derivation from 
'ad-jaceo'~ to lie at, or near. It has been said that the 
wo.rd has no arbitrary meaning or defi.ni tion) but that 
the term is a relative and not a definite and abso!ute 
one, and the exact meaning of · w hichJ in any particular · 
case, is determinable principally by the c:ontat in which 
it is used, the facts and ci rrums ta nces of the case, the 
subject tnatter to which it is applicd;t or the intent of 
the Legislature or the parti cs, and the word is usually 
to be given a broad sub stan ti al construct io·n and not 
I im ited to the literal meaning as defined by 1 exicog-
gr.aphers. '" 1 
"AdjacenfJ is defined in Petitioners of &hool District 
N(). 9) Caddo County: v~ Jones~ District Judge~ et al~~ Okla~ 
homa, 1919, 1.40 P(2d) 922~ Therein the definition of the 
term) as contained in Webster's Dictionary of Synonytns, is 
quoted with approval as follows: 
nAdjacent does not always imply actual contact, but 
it does not admit of any thing of the same kind between; 
thus) adjacent 1 ots are in con tact~ but adjacent houses 
may or may not bf:\" 
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This definition was approved by City of Ada v. ·whitaker et al +) 
212 P ( 2d) 482 (Okla. 1949) ~ 
The only sensible \llt1ay to define Hadjacent" in the Utah 
statute~ supra, would be the same as in the two Oklahoma 
cases. Thus~ adjacent intersections would not admit of another 
in te rsectio n behv een th etrL 
The argwnent tnight be advanced that if this construction 
is adopted~ great inconvenience ~~ould be encountered by the 
motorists being obJiged to recognize unmarked crosswalks 
such as the one in this case. But) on the other hand) if the Court 
should hold adjacent meant !t near~'' untold- confusion and 
hardships to the pedestrian would be the result. ~ .. Near'' is a 
generic term and there are streets in this city, in fact all over 
the state~ where the traffic signals are all the vi a y from three 
blocks to a mile apart and the road is intersected by many 
streets, none having marked cross\valks. The pedestrian would 
have to walk blocks in order to cross the road. Under the 
sensible construction of the 'vord ~ 4 adjacent,'' as set out by 
the 0 klahom a courts, it would be a comparatively slm ple 111 at tcr 
for the City to place signs at the cross v.ralks of the intersections 
they did not wish the pc d estria n to cross. See Sections 41·6-2 0, 
41-6-21, and 41-6-22, ULC.A. 1953. 
It is safe to assume that the law \vas originally written 
to cover instances like Main Street betv{een ti .irs t and Second 
South) Second South and Third Sou th;t etc. 
The south sidewalk on First Avenue extends level to State 
Street J an actual invitation for pedestrians to eros s there. The 
conditions are exactly similar to those on the north side, ext ept 
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as to the sign and the painted lines. There is no sign there 
dir~ting pedestrians not to cross. The place where plaintiff 
crossed was an u.n tnar ked eros s v..'"a lk as defined by Section 
11-6-8~ supra. 
The Court, in Instruction No. 6, instructed the jury that 
the plaintiff ~Tas negligent as a matter of la¥.r for walking 
"\vhere she did+ In Instruction No. 7~ the Court said she was. 
obliged to yield the right~of-way to defendant's approaching 
au tomo bile. In vi e~T of those two instructions, it was impossible 
for the plaintiff to recover. The first paragraph of In.,truction 
No. 8 does not help~ 
~·Regardless of the court's instruction that plaintiff 
v.,r as guilty of negligence in crossing where she did and 
regard 1 ess of whether you shall determine that she 
was negJigent in faiJing to yield the right-of-way to 
defendant~ if you do so determine, the court instructs 
you that before either or both of such acts of negligence 
VtJT i I l bar plain tiff from rccove ring her damages from 
defendant you must first .find that either one or both of 
such acts of negllgence was a proximate~ contributory 
cause of the accident and of plaintiff's injuries.n 
The first th.ing the jury \VOu]d say is that if she hadn't 
been in the position which the Court said \vas negligent anJ 
unla\vful, the accident never would have happened~ 
The Court, s error in giving Instructions No. 6 and 7 ~ and 
failing to give plaintiffs requested instructions as set forth in 
the statement of the case constituted prejudicial error. 
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POINT II. 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS CONTRARY TO 
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
COURT ERRED lN I\iOT DIRECTING THE JURY TO 
RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
Assignments of Error 1~ 2, 3~ 4~ and 5. 
If the plain tiH 's contention is correct in Point I~ then she 
was crossing State Street in an unmarked cross,valk, as defined 
by subdivision (b), Section 41-6-8, U .C.A~ 19 53. In that 
event, the p 1 ai ntiff had the right ·Of w way over the de£ en dan t 
who was making his left turn south on State Street. 
Subdivision (a)~ Section 41-6w 78, U.C.A. 1953: 
~·Pedestrians' right-of-way. - (a) When traffic-
control signals are not in place or not in operation 
the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-wayl 
slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield~ to 
a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a cross "'ralk 
\\~hen the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway 
upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedes-
trian is approaching so c los ely from the o ppo site half 
of the road\vay as to be in danger, but no pedestrian 
shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety 
and walk or run into the path of a vehicle ~· hich is 
so close that l t is impossible for the driver to yicl d. 
This provision shall not apply under the conditions 
stated in 41-6-78 (b) .n 
Coombs v+ Perry, 2 Utah 389, 275 P(2d) 680 
Mingus v. Olsson 1 114 Utah 505, 201 P (2d) 495 
Smith v. BennettJ 1 Utah 2nd 224, 265 P (2d) 101 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T'he writers are mindfu] of the pedestrian's obligations. 
The pedestrian's right~of~way is not absolute. 1'he pedestrian 
has a right-o£-v.,.·ay, but not a right to self-jnflictcd mayhem for 
\V hich the defendant can be held liable~ M1ngus v. Olsson, 
supra. 
Where a pedestrian failed to look, or having looked, 
failed to see \V hat he should have seen and paid heed to, the 
cas cs ho] J is negligence! but by the same ~ok en :t the motorist 
has some duties too. As was so aptly said in Jurlsch v+ Puget 
Tranportation Co.) Supreme Court of Washingtor:J 1927, 25R 
Pac. 39: 
·"If the conceded right of way means anything at 
all, it puts the nece5sity of continuous observation and 
a voidance of injury upon the driver of the automobile 
when approaching a crossing, just as the necessity of 
the case puts tn e sam c higher degree of care upon the 
pedestrian at other places than at crossings. j ~ 
Crossings are there especially for pedestrians~ and motorists 
in approaching them must bear this in mind. The driver of 
an a utomobi!e should always be a ware of the fact that pedes~ 
trians may be crossing a street at intersections and that pedes-
trians so crossing the street are en tit 1 eJ to the right -of-way r 
· To conclusively show that the defendant Vrt7as guilty of 
negligence in this case and th.a t the plain tiff was free £rom 
contributory negligence~ let us look at the record. The plain-
tiff~ eighty-four years of age at that time~ stopped on the-. \Vest 
curb of State Street~ immediate I y facing the crosswalk on the 
south side of the intersection of State Street and First Avenue. 
She looked up and down to see if there were any cars. There 
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weren~t any. There was no car coming down First Avenue 
that had entered the intersection and so she decided to cross. 
The plaintiff had a right to presume that a motorist who might 
come down First Avenue would stop at the stop sign~ and 
before making his left hand tu.tn, exercise due care to ascertain 
tbat such movement could be made with reasonable safety. 
She walked a few steps straight east tov.lard the south sidewalk 
of First Avenue and was struck. That is all she remembered. 
It is undisputed that there was a heavy, wet snowstorm 
at the time. The defendant was driving west on First Avenue~ 
and jntended turning south on State Street~ His visibility was 
poor and the snow \vas plastering on the windshield (R. 34). 
His right front window and his left fran t window ~rer e fogged~ 
He could only .see through the sweep of the windshield wiper 
(R~ 38). He could see straight ahead, but couldn~t see to the 
left or right. He stopped at the stop sign~ according to his 
testimony, and after looking to the north and south, as he said, 
and there was no traffic, made a normal left hand turn (R. 3 6) + 
If he was facing west~ he would have had great difficulty seeing 
any appreciable distance to the north or to the south. He could 
only see practically straight in front of ~im. 
The defendant first told officer Lescoe that he saw Mrs. 
Langlois thirty or forty feet fro ~n the paint of impact~ Then at 
the trial he .said that he sa\v her ten or twelve feet~ In his 
general statement to officer Lescoe, he said he didn't see her 
until he was prac:tica ll y on top of her. How ever, at the trial, 
he was very sure that he first saw her three to four feet east 
of the west curb+ There is no q uestlon that Mrs. Lang lois \Vas 
struck fourteen feet east of the west curb. 
2 ...., ) 
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This eighty-four-year-old woman walked from ten to 
eleven feet from the point defendant first saw her to the point 
v,rhere she · was struck. According to one part of defendant's 
testimony~ that he saw her ten or eleven feet away, then his 
car had to be going the s arne s. peed as the plain tiff~ If such 
VttTere the case) he could have stopped. Obviously, his statement 
in that regard is VY' rong. If the de£ endant, as is claimed~ was 
watching Mrs+ Langlois walking across the street with a paper 
o¥·er her head from three feet from the west curb to the point 
where she vl as s true k fourteen feet east of the curb, it would 
clear 1 y appear that he had hvo choices to make. First, he could 
have cut over to the west side of State Street and missed her. 
Se:eond~ he could have stopped. Ha.d the de£ endant~ a.s he once 
told the officer l seen the plaintiff thirty or forty feet away, he 
could have stopped his car unless he was speeding. In either 
event, he would have been negligent. 
T h c third a 1 ternative is that the defendant, either on 
account of inattention on his part or on account of the snow 
on the v.,·indshield and the fog on the windows) failed to see 
the plaintiff. He proceeded to make the left hand tum and 
was~ as he said in another part of his testimony"j right on top 
of her before he saw her. At any rate) he knocked or pushed 
Mrs. Lang lois a distance of eleven or twelve feet south~ ·where 
she was picked up~ 
Any one of the above alternatives demonstrates the cle-
fen dan t = s negligence beyond a peradventure of a doubt. The 
defendant didn't sound any warning, yet he knew or should 
. have known that his vision \v a.s obscured and someone might 
be on the c ross"v a lk. 1~he la v . / is cor recti y stated in pl a.in tiff's 
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requested Instruction No. 5~ taken from 72 A.L.R~ 1352. A mo-
h) r ist shou 1 d be able to stop within the range of his vision. 
nlf his vision is obscured by snow, sleet at fog on 
the windshield or windows so that he cannot see the 
required distance ahead~ or to the side a.s the case rna y 
be, he must~ within such distance from the point of 
such 1 ack of vision~ b tin g his car to such control that 
he can stop lmmediateJy, and if he cannot then see, 
should stop r ~ ~ 
The cases on automobile and ped~strian are legion and 
many cases have gone so far as to indicate that a pedestrian 
should anticipate almost anything that a careless motorist 
might do. Such is not the law here nor should it be. Was Mrs. 
Lang! o is~ the plain tiff here~ required to anticipate that someone 
comtng west on First A venue and State Street~ with his vision 
obscured by snow and fog on vvi.ndshield and windo,vs, would . 
carelessly and negligently run into her? 
Mrs. Langlois was not contributorily negligent A recent 
Personal Injury N ev,rsl etter reviewed, as they said, ~~two beau ti-
fully written opinions·'' from Michigan in which the Court 
held PEDESTRIAN IS NOT A 4 ~LEGAL SITTING DUCK.'' 
The Court said: 
~~The test of con tr l butory negligence is not \v h ether 
the plaintiff did al] that he concei va bl y could have 
done or even all that. in retrospect~ it is obvious he 
shouj d have don e. Plaintiff did fail to make a proper 
estimate of defenda..nfs proximity through the windov..rs 
of the daub J c-par ked car. Plain tifi did fail to anti ci pate 
defendant's s'werve into the other side of the street. 
Plain tiff did fail to make a correct decision on the 
direction from which his greatest danger might come. 
But~ asked th€ court, 'Can we really say that these 
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failures .of judgment \vere such a.s to be undebatably 
outside the realm of conduct of the ordinarily-prudent 
person ? . . . As the power and acce tera tion of the 
automobile have increased the effectiveness of the 
' evasive ac t.i on of the pedestrian has d eel ined. ~ r • This 
Court should not leave the pedestrian a legal sitt_ing 
duck.:> " Ware v. Nelson, 88 NW 2nd 524 (M1ch. 
1958) ~ 
The decis1on in the Ware case was tendered on March 5, 1958. 
A day earlier, the Michigan court held in Ba ttl ett v. MeJ zo~ 
88 N\V 2n~ 518 (Mich. 1958): 
~~At common law~ unaided by statute or ordinance~ 
the rights of pedestrians .and motorists at crossings 
"~N ere said to be equal~ It was the duty of each to exe r-
· cise due care. But a dis tinction 1 s dra v.rn in the la. \\~ of 
negligence behveen standard and amount o£ care (em-
phasis. by the court). A motorist tnust exercise a greater 
am aunt of care than a pedestrian. The motorist has 
under his control an instrumentality capable of inflict-
ing great bodi 1 y harm u pan relatively slight impact 
and at slight risk to himself~ This aspect of the la. w of 
negligence has not received the emphasis demanded 
by its significance in the motorist-pedestrian cases. This 
is one reason \V hy the common Ia w rule of reciprocal 
rights and duties has not sufficed to protect pedestrians 
from the hazards of ever-increasing automobile tra..ff ic 
Legislative bodies have sought other solutions and have 
given the pedestrian the right of way at street cross-
ings. The same ordinance is involved in this case as 
was involved in Moldenhauer v. Smith} 311 Mich. 
265) 18 NW 2nd 818 ( 1945). In that case, despite the 
right of '"vay given the pedestrian by the ordinance, 
he \Vas held to be contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law. _The Molde?hauer case erroneously interpreted 
the ordmance and 1s overruled. The ordinance entitles 
the pedestrian to positive preferential treatment at 
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crosswalks. The care required of the motorist goes 
beyond the common law rule of ordinary care. 'We 
do not sit to render nugatory the efforts of our people 
to protect their lives and limbs. The ordinance places 
upon the motorist certain affirmative duties: He must 
approach a crosswalk at such moderate speed as to 
be able to yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing 
therein, and he able to bring his car to a complete stopj 
if necessary, to a ceo rd the pedestrian his right of way.' 
~ 4 The tenor of the decision in the Bartlett case is 
probably best expressed by these words of the court: 
·we look with horror upon ancient rites involving 
human sacrifice. We take pride in our progression from 
the sacrifice of the first-born son, to the Iamb~ then to 
the abolition of sacrifice entirely~ yet historians of the 
future may well note that it was a common sight in 
our cities in this era to observe the citizens of the camp 
munity running for their lives~ literally~ if caught in 
the center of the street by a changing traffic light. 
Those not so nimble as others perish in greater nwn~ 
hers. The decedent whose case is before us was. 76 
years of age. Whether he was able to run or not the 
record does not disclose. When asked if the decedent 
began to run when the traffic started moving, as he 
was leaving the center of the road~ a ~vitness replied 
that ~·the first couple of steps he walked~n The next 
question: ·~Did he run after that?~! A. "He speeded it 
up.'~ ' Concludes the court~ '-Not, certainly, enough.:> " 
Mrs. Langlois had a right to cross \vhere she did. It was 
not in cum bent upon her to use the north mar ked intersection. 
If it could be said tb at she should have gone there, then it 
could be said that she should have walked either to ).Jorth 
Temple or to South TempJe where signal lights made it even 
safer to cross. The plaintiff was not contributorily negligent 
and the Court erred in failing to direct a verdict in her favor. 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Even in the event the lower Court was right and the 
plaintiff ~vas not in a marked cro5swalk as defined by Section 
41 w6w8, she sti 1 J 1;VO ul d haVe been entitled to recover. pedestrians 
customarily crossed State Street where this accident occurred. 
The defendant 'vas familiar with tha.t intersection and he had 
seen people cross at that point. He kne\v pedestrians crossed 
there and knew· that they might be using that a.rea at any time. 
Therefore~ having that kno-\vledge, he had the dutY to drive at 
that point with the same care and caution as if it were an actual 
mar ked pedestrian lane. 
Morgan V~ Domino, La. App. 166 s+ 208 ( 1936): 
··Considering defendant~ s knowledge that the place 
in question was customarily used by pedes tri.ans as a 
crossing, the principle of la-w- governing motor ist.s and 
pedestrians at public crossings or street in tcrsections 
in the absence of statutes or ordinances is applicable. 
This p r i nci pie is that motorist and the pedestrian have 
equality of right in the use of the crossing, and each 
must exercise such right with reasonable regard for 
the sa£ etr and convenience of others ... , 
Miller v. Tiedemann) 94 A. 835, 249 Pa. 234 ( 1915): 
~1t is true Mr~ Miller was not crossing street at 
the end of a block, still he was doing so at a point which 
defendant~ s chauffeur knew was customarily and very 
generally used for tba t pw pose.·~ 
The Court erred in ·not instructing the jury that the plain-
tiff had the right-of \vay. In fact, under the circumstances~ the 
Court should have instructed the jury to bring jn a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant~ 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is another illustration of the hazard of driving 
an automobile during a heavy wet snowstorm. Here, the only 
visibility the defendant had was through the sweep of the 
windshield wi pet. His side windows, according to defendant's 
own tes tirnony ~ were fogged. If the ~·indo ws were fogged the 
probability is that the windshield was also fogged. When a 
pedestrian comes into view from either side in circumstances 
such as this~ he often appears to come suddenly~ Instead of 
excusing a driver~ it only adds to the degree of care required. 
Instructions No. 6 and 7 given by the Court were clear 1 y 
erroneous. North Temple and South Temple are not adjacent 
intersections any more than Salt Lake City and Sacramento are 
adjacent state capitals; Cars on City intervenes. The plaintiff 
bad the right-of-way+ The plaintiff did everything required 
of a pedestrian in crossing the street. She did not have the 
agility of a university athlete to jump out of the way and even 
a university athlete~ in this case~ would have been beset with 
difficulties had he tried to escape the oncoming car. The de-
fendant was driving too fast for existing conditions, especially . 
in view of poor visibility and a h ea "'1'" ~ wet snowstorm. 
Wherefore~ your appellant prays that this Court reverse 
the trial Court and enter j udgm en t for the p 1 a in tiff. 
Respectfully submitted; 
RAY S+ McCARTY and 
C. Vb"'RNON LANGLOIS 
29 
Attorneys fat< Plainti_ff 
and Appellant 
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